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The relation between method, concept and theory in science is complicated. I seek
to shed light on that relation by considering an instance of it in systematics: The
additional challenges phylogeneticists face when reconstructing phylogeny not at a
single level, but simultaneously at multiple levels of the hierarchy. How does this
complicate the task of phylogenetic inference, and how might it inform and shape the
conceptual foundations of phylogenetics? This offers a lens through which the
interplay of method, theory and concepts may be understood in systematics, which,
in turn, provides data for a more general account.
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Multilevel Lineages and Multidimensional Trees:
The Levels of Lineage and Phylogeny Reconstruction
1 Introduction.
The relation between method, concept and theory is complicated. I seek to shed light on
that relation by considering the additional challenges that arise in reconstructing
phylogeny not at a single level, but simultaneously at multiple levels of the hierarchy.
How does this complicate the task of phylogenetic inference, and how might it inform and
shape the conceptual and theoretical foundations of phylogenetics?
The initial contours of these challenges can be grouped into two main projects:
epistemological and ontological. How do patterns at one level of the biological hierarchy
inform us of patterns at other levels? This is complicated by the presence of multilevel
genealogical discordance, namely, when the pattern of phylogeny at one level of the
biological hierarchy fails to map onto patterns at other levels. As the degree and kinds of
discordance between levels increases, so too do the challenges for inferring phylogeny.
How might (or should) discordance be incorporated into phylogenetic methodology and
theory? How much can or should this discordance be accounted for in phylogeny
reconstruction? How does discordance impact our phylogeny, lineage and species
concepts?
To address these challenges, I recommend adopting a Levels of Lineage perspective, i.e., a
set of commitments about the structure of evolutionary lineages that provide resources
for addressing the methodological, theoretical and conceptual challenges raised by
reconstruction of multilevel lineages. This offers a lens through which the interplay of
method, theory and concepts may be understood in systematics, which, in turn, provides
data for a more general account.
I begin with a brief sketch of the levels of lineage perspective, followed by a discussion of
the epistemological challenges of producing multidimensional trees, i.e., how
incorporating information about different kinds of discordance complicates phylogenetic
inference. I then consider the ontological implications of multilevel lineages,
characterizing them as complex multiply decomposable objects. This reveals a payoff of
the levels of lineage perspective: recognition that biological objects do not simply grade
into one another over space and time, but over levels of hierarchy as well. This
complicates how we conceive of the edges and boundaries of biological objects, offers a
re-boot of the entrenched species problem, and a theoretical basis for a constrained
pluralism of species, lineages and phylogenies.
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2 The Levels of Lineage Perspective.
Specifying the Levels of Lineage perspective more precisely will provide the resources to
identify the theories, concepts, and methods at play in reconstructing multilevel lineages,
and help make sense of the challenges that arise.
The levels of lineage perspective is a commitment to the following propositions:
• The biological world is hierarchically organized;
• A level of the biological hierarchy is constituted by lineage-generating entities;
• Parts of the biological hierarchy are, in part, constituted by and constitutive of
other parts of the hierarchy;
• Genealogical discordance is exhibited between levels;
• No single level of lineage offers a privileged perspective of phylogeny.
Some of these are obviously more controversial than others. The point is not to defend
these commitments, or even to make the case that they are widely held, rightly or not,
among phylogeneticists (though I think they are). Rather it is simply to stipulate the
perspective being taken as backdrop. Let’s consider each proposition briefly.
The biological world is hierarchically organized. This is an empirical claim, though the
facts are in dispute; e.g., Ereshefsky (1992) and Dupre´ (1995) adopt different pluralist
stances towards the hierarchy, whereas Potochnik and McGill (2012) suggest replacing
levels with scales, arguing this better reflects causal significance and interaction. Those
disputes aside, in a levels of lineage perspective the hierarchical organization is
understood as a product of evolution, so, in part, demands an evolutionary explanation,
e.g., why this hierarchy, rather than a different one, or one at all? This requires the
adoption of a diachronic approach, aligning this commitiment with diachronic treatments
of evolutionary processes, mechanisms and structures (e.g., Griffiths 1974;
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1998; Szathma´ry 2000; Griesemer 2000b; Okasha 2006;
Godfrey-Smith 2009). Explaining, describing, and understanding the patterns of
hierarchical organization from a phylogenetic perspective sets the research and conceptual
problems of the perspective.
A level of the biological hierarchy is constituted by lineage-generating entities. Not just
any biological entity will generate a lineage, only those that satisfy certain criteria. What
those criteria are, of course, is highly contentious. This is typically framed as a problem
of reproduction (Hennig 1966; Griesemer 2000a,b; Godfrey-Smith 2009), and may be
generalized across levels, e.g., microbes (Dupre´ and O’Malley 2009), colonies (Hamilton
et al. 2009), evolutionary individuals (Janzen 1977) or clades (Okasha 2003; Hamilton
and Haber 2006). Bouchard (2008) adopts a broader framework of differential
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persistence, regarding reproduction as simply one kind of growth or lineage maintenance.
This provides novel (though contentious) ways to account for microbial, colony, and
population-level lineages (Simpson 1961; Wiley 1978; Bouchard 2010).
Parts of the biological hierarchy are constituted by and constitutive of other parts of the
hierarchy. These part-whole relations are biological, not logical (Haber 2013).
Interpreting these relations is central to characterizing the entities, processes, mechanisms
and structures of biology in a levels of lineage perspective. This captures a fundamental
component of the individuality thesis (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976, 1978). Hull notes how
this commitment complicates evolutionary processes: “A simple characterization of the
units which function in evolution is further complicated by the fact that the units at
various levels of organization are related by the part-whole relation, and the functions
which they perform are both multiple and variable” (1976, 184). Martens (2010), Okasha
(2011) and Haber (2013) extend this complication to biological objects, arguing that
some organisms are parts of or constituted by other organisms. This commitment is
iterative, though a regress may be avoided by specifying maximal and minimal levels,
e.g., a maximal clade, or minimal reproducer (Griesemer 2000b; Ga´nti 2003).
Genealogical discordance is exhibited between levels. This is an empirical claim about the
fidelity of phylogenetic patterns exhibited between levels of the biological hierarchy.
Simply put, lineages are leaky, and monophyly at one level of the biological hierarchy
does not ensure that the parts of that level will share the same pattern of ancestry and
evolution. This is especially notable for microbial organisms, given the extensive presence
of lateral gene transfer (Doolittle and Bapteste 2007). Yet discordance is exhibited across
the levels of hierarchy, and accounting for it is a central levels of lineage problem (see
Doyle 1992; Maddison 1997; Degnan and Rosenberg 2006; Avise and Robinson 2008;
Velasco 2008; Dupre´ 2010; Ereshefsky 2010, among others). Rather than explain away
genealogical discordance as a bug, this commitment recognizes it as a feature of the
biological hierarchy. Then these discordance patterns may be studied and perhaps
explained or predicted by theory, e.g., discordance should be unsurprising on multilevel
selection. This is the challenge of incorporating multilevel genealogical discordance into
phylogenetic methodology, theory, and concepts.
No single level of lineage offers a privileged perspective of phylogeny. This is a conceptual
commitment, and perhaps the most controversial of those listed here. It applies
Wimsatt’s (1972) work describing reduction and multiple decomposability of complex
objects to phylogenetics. It may independently be derived from pluralist stances (e.g.,
Ereshefsky 1992; Dupre´ 1995), though pluralism is neither necessary nor sufficient for this
commitment.
In addition to these commitments, it will be useful to introduce the following terminology:
• Multidimensional Tree: A representation or model of phylogeny including more
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than one level of the biological hierarchy;
• Multilevel Lineage: A lineage consisting of multiple levels of lineages.
The former may be used to represent the latter, though need not necessarily endorse a
commitment to multilevel lineages. Multidimensional trees are not new. Hennig uses
them to introduce phylogenetic concepts and theory, and to represent the internal
structure of lineages, including organismal and developmental lineages (see figure 1). This
suggests that a levels of lineage perspective has persisted from the root of phylogenetics.
Figure 1: Multidimensional trees have been used from the foundation of phylogenetics. Hennig
used them to introduce phylogenetic theory and concepts (Hennig 1966, figure 6).
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3 Multidimensional Trees.
Phylogeneticists typically suppress the internal structure of phylogenies in order to
clearly focus on a single level (e.g., species or population lineages). Idealization of this
sort is hardly unique in the sciences, and, arguably, may be central to its success
(Cartwright 1983; Giere 1997; Teller 2001). Reconstructing multilevel lineages with
multidimensional trees reveals some of this internal structure, and introduces additional
methodological hurdles in phylogeny reconstruction. One reason for this is genealogical
discordance. Discordance has several causes, including lineage sorting (or deep coalescent
events), gene duplication and extinction, horizontal (or lateral) gene transfer
(HGT/LGT), hybridization, and recombination (Degnan and Rosenberg 2009). Each
carries its own unique epistemic challenges (Maddison 1997), though here I consider how
genealogical discordance more generally complicates phylogenetic inference.
Phylogeneticists take genealogical discordance seriously, and advances in technology
(theory, etc.) are permitting a deeper look at the internal structure of phylogenies. This
is plainly seen as coalescent theory is applied to populations and used to infer phylogeny.
Briefly, multispecies coalescent techniques permit the reconstruction of species- (or
population-) level phylogeny through analysis of the internal structure of populations
(Kingman 1982; Hudson 1983; Tajima 1983). This introduces additional complications
for phylogenetic inference. If the shape of the containing tree is short (in number of
generations) and wide (in effective population size), then lineage sorting (or deep
coalescence) will produce genealogical discordance between gene, organismal, population
and species phylogenies (Pamilo and Nei 1988). Avise and Robinson (2008, 503) call
instances of this hemiplasies, a concept they introduce to capture how “idiosyncratic
lineage sorting can lead to fundamental discordances between gene trees and organismal
(species) trees” (see figure 2). Though homologous, hemiplasies appear as homoplasies,
and may confound phylogenetic inference
Accounting for genealogical discordance in phylogeny reconstruction effectively adds more
parameters along which parsimony (or likelihood, or probability) may be disputed. For
example, were we simply considering hemiplasies (or HGT, etc.), by what metric should
we evaluate what counts as a more parsimonious explanation of genealogical discordance?
Should we simply count the number of hemiplasies, selecting the tree requiring the
fewest, or should we select the tree requiring the simplest model of evolution that
explains the presence of those events? Either case demands a trade-off. In the former,
fewer hemiplaies may entail more complex models, whereas in the latter a simpler model
may entail more hemiplasies. This is not different in kind from arguments over simple
application of parsimony to homology and homoplasy (Felsenstein 2004), though
accounting for discordance increases the number of parameters along which this argument
occurs. Maddison (1997) offers considerations along these lines, speculating what
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Figure 2: Avise and Robinson (2008, figure 1) introduced the term hemiplasy to capture
instances of discordance due to lineage sorting (or deep coalescence). In (a) the gene and
species trees are concordant, and homology is apparent. In (b) a deep coalescent event presents
homologous genes as homoplasies. This is a hemiplasy.
parsimony and ML approaches1 to inferring species trees from gene trees in the presence
of discordance might look like.
Unfortunately, recent studies suggest that accounting for discordance is unlikely to be a
simple addition of parameters. Degnan and Rosenberg (2006, 2009) demonstrate that
under certain conditions, hemiplasies may outnumber homologies and confound
phylogenetic methods such as the multispecies coalescent. That is, when the most
common gene tree is discordant with the species tree, a simple parsimony weighting of
hemiplasies will systematically select the wrong tree with ever increasing support as data
accumulates (they describe such cases as wicked forests). Whether these positively
misleading errors are likely to manifest with other causes of genealogical discordance is
presently not known,2 though in each case the biological facts are likely to be complicated
and demand similar accommodation and analysis in our phylogenetic theories, concepts
and methods.
Whether these various sources of discordance should be considered independently, or
whether a mixed strategy that simultaneously considers all sources is preferable is both a
1We could add Bayesian analysis.
2Though see Galtier and Daubin (2008) with regard to HGT.
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theoretical and methodogical problem. This is akin to asking whether sources of
discordance should be treated as independent parameters, or as a more dynamic
interdependent bunch. Though not different in kind from the sorts of epistemological
debates phylogeneticists wrestle with in single-level phylogenetic inference, discordance
escalates the problem exponentially. For example, developing methods for these
competing strategies requires development of models of evaluation, which, in turn, draw
upon phylogenetic theory and concepts (which may themselves require refinement in light
of discordance). Again the interplay of method, theory, and concept is on display.
To summarize: The theories, concepts, and methods that are part of the levels of lineage
perspective together frame and identify research problems. These are sensitive to
empirical facts, and feed back into one another as data are accommodated, discovered, or
explained. Conceptually, the internal structure of trees was exploited to establish
phylogenetic theory and develop phylogenetic methods (e.g., Hennig 1966). The
possibility of genealogical discordance is entailed by numerous biological theories that are
more or less well integrated with phylogenetics (e.g., HGT by microbial biology, lineage
sorting by coalescent theory).3 As the extent of the presence of kinds of genealogical
discordance became better known, methods and theories were refined to account for these
facts and more subtle phylogenetic concepts proposed to capture the theoretically
significant patterns and objects previously categorized too bluntly. Together, this
provides a snapshot of the interplay of theory, concept and methods in science.
4 Multilevel Lineages.
What is being represented by multidimensional trees? What is a multilevel lineage? A
level of the biological hierarchy is constituted by lineage-generating entities, which
themselves are constituted by and constitutive of other lineage-generating entities. A
lineage, then, will both contain other lineages, and be a part of a broader lineage. This is
an iterative definition, bottoming out and topping off at minimal and maximal lineages,
respectively. The latter will be something like a maximal clade (or segment thereof); the
former generated by minimal lineage-generating biological entities, though what those
might be is unsettled.4 Candidates include self-replicating RNA (Cech 1986) and
chemotons (Ga´nti 2003). Given the diachronic approach implicit in the levels of lineage
perspective, it is no accident these coincide with entities hypothesized in origin of life
research (e.g., Dupre´ and O’Malley 2009).5 Furthermore, these lineages are embedded
3Multilevel selection also likely entails genealogical discordance between inclusive levels of biological
individuals, though this has not been formulated precisely.
4Griesemer (2000b) uses a similar strategy of iterative definition for reproducers.
5There may be multiple kinds of minimal lineages, just as there may be multiple kinds of original living
things. Likewise, there may be multiple maximal clades, in part due to the poorly resolved basal roots
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one in another in complicated patterns which may function as either explanans or
explanandum of other biological patterns and processes.
A lot may be said of multilevel lineages. Here the focus will be on specifying multilevel
lineages as complex objects in terms of multiple decomposability. This carries
implications for species, lineage and phylogeny concepts, and permits a constrained
pluralism. The upshot is recognizing that biological gradients apply over levels of the
hierarchy, in addition to the more familiar gradients that extend over time and space.
4.1 Multiple Decomposability.
Figure 3: Wimsatt’s (1972, figure 1) depiction of complexity and multiple decomposability.
Full-size figure at end of document (labeled as figure 5).
Wimsatt (1972) introduced the notion of multiple decomposability (figure 3). In the
levels of lineage perspective, lineages are recognized as genealogically discordant
multilevel objects. These are in part constituted by other lineages and themselves
constitutive of lineage-generating entities. These lineages occupy the various levels of the
biological hierarchy, and are discordant in ways that bear tracking.6 Furthermore, at
of the Tree of Life. A maximal web or network of life may be a better candidate (Doolittle and Bapteste
2007).
6What I mean by ‘bear tracking’ is ambiguous and needs some unpacking. It could mean that reliable
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least some levels of the biological hierarchy overlap in complex ways, with different
decompositions tracking those various patterns, i.e., lineages are multiply decomposable,
and phylogeneticists exploit this fact (compare figures 3 and 4).
Figure 4: Degnan and Rosenberg’s (2009, figure 1) depiction of the multispecies coalescent.
This displays various decompositions of the species tree, and the discordances that arise. Full-
size figure at end of document (labeled as figure 6).
It should hardly be surprising that lineages are multiply decomposable. Wimsatt uses
organisms as paradigmatic examples of complex objects (i.e., those that are multiply
decomposable). Organisms are complex, in part, due to the fact that they are composed
of many kinds of lineage-generating parts.7
inferences may be drawn, good explanations offered, or theoretically relevant biological objects tracked.
If multiple decompositions satisfy these criteria, then pluralism may follow. An attractive feature of this
account is that specifying what bears tracking both motivates and constrains pluralism. In other words,
recognizing what justifies expanding available concepts is to also recognize what restricts those concepts.
7Multiple decomposability may also be framed in terms of genomics or selection (see Janzen 1977; Dupre´
2010).
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Furthermore, organisms themselves generate lineages, at the level of populations, demes,
and species. Given both the complexity of ways in which organisms and their parts move
and interact through these various lineages, and that organisms themselves are multiply
decomposable, we should expect that higher-level lineages would retain this feature of
decomposability.
That multilevel lineages are multiply decomposable carries ontological implications.
First, it offers a means of cashing out pluralism about species, especially if species are
conceived of as segments of lineages of organisms (or populations, or breeding groups,
etc.). The various decompositions may produce multiple (inconsistent) patterns of
ancestry. This observation may provide a way to break through the entrenched logjam
that is the so-called species-problem (or, to give due credit, buttress the ontological
aspect of Ereshefsky’s (1992) eliminative pluralism). Debates over species concepts, at
times, turn on patterns that persist in lower-level entities. Presuming a single
decomposition, or that one decomposition offers a privileged perspective, generates
unwarranted conflict, and may wrongly entail a monist position on species (or, for that
matter, lineages). This need not be the case. Biologists might recognize multiple
decompositions, and appropriately regard them as equally (or variously) informative, yet
still wish to assign to one (or more) of those decompositions the rank of species. This,
though, is a matter of ranking versus grouping, i.e., a matter of which groups ought to be
designated with the rank species. That is a slightly different dispute, and one many are
eager to move past (e.g., Mishler 1999).
4.2 Extending Gradients.
If species are lineages (regardless of sort), and lineages are multiply decomposable, then
there will be no simple object to identify as a species. Even diachronic approaches (e.g.,
de Queiroz 1998; Harrison 1998) will be too static. The gradients along which species
extend on these views is over time and space; that gradient must be extended over the
levels of hierarchy as well.8
Ultimately, this is reminiscent of Sober’s (1980) treatment of populations, but applied to
phylogenetics. Just as Sober rejects the natural state model in favor of variance as central
to our concept of a population, and Wimsatt rejects a privileged decomposition, so too
should we reject an absolute phylogeny. Maddison recognizes the ontological implications
of adopting a levels of lineage perspective:
When we take a sample from a population and try to understand a statistical
distribution by calculating means and variances, we do not single out all of
the samples whose values differ from the mean as disagreeing with the mean.
8Baetu (forthcoming) comes close to this.
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They are simply part of the variance, part of the distribution. A simple
phylogenetic tree diagram with sticklike branches represents only the mean or
mode of a distribution. Phylogeny has a variance as well, represented by the
diversity of trees of different genes. This variance does not represent
uncertainty due to ignorance or measurement error; it is an intrinsic part of
phylogeny’s nature. (1997, 533)
It is certainly tempting to stipulate one level as the Archimedean point around which the
rest of phylogeny flows. But this is a mistake, if we accept Wimsatt’s lesson about
multiple decomposability and the lack of privileged perspective. This is the phylogenetic
analogue to Sober’s contrast of population thinking to the natural state model view. Just
as we abandoned Newton’s notion of absolute space for relativity, the lesson to draw here
is that there is no absolute phylogeny, no privileged perspective from which all others
derive. We can just as well hold organismal as interbreeding population lineages constant,
and, indeed, this is just what population geneticists do (e.g., Avise and Wollenberg 1997;
Coyne and Orr 2004). That conflicts with other evolutionary histories (of organisms, or
genomes, etc.) may arise is not an indicator of incoherency, but of facts in need of
explanation (contra Velasco 2008). This is part and parcel of the complexity of biology,
and hardly unique to phylogenetics. Indeed, in so far as there are laws in biology, their
utility is often most perspicacious when they fail to hold true (e.g., Mendel’s laws of
inheritance, or the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium). Why should phylogenetics be different?
That the edges and boundaries of biological objects grade into each other over space and
time is well appreciated. The lesson here is that biological gradients also span levels of
hierarchical organization. The added dimensions of how we ought to conceive of
biological objects are, admittedly, difficult to grasp. Yet recognizing this challenge is the
first step, and the levels of lineage perspective, along with multidimensional trees and a
rich multilevel lineage concept, provide the resources to account for this complexity.
5 Conclusion.
Recall that the initial framing concerned the interplay of method, concept and theory in
science. I considered how this plays out in systematics when phylogeneticists aim to
reconstruct phylogeny not at a single level, but simultaneously at multiple levels of the
hierarchy. Methods of phylogeny reconstruction require both a theoretical and conceptual
basis. Incorporating coalescent theory into phylogeny reconstruction is attractive for
various reasons, e.g., it permits a point of contact between phylogenetics and population
genetics. Using the multispecies coalescent to reconstruct phylogenies, though, draws
bare the underlying genealogical discordance exhibited between gene trees and species or
population trees, and demands refining existing methods or developing new techniques.
Furthermore, under some circumstances the discordance is so great as to generate a
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positively misleading error, i.e., wicked forest anomaly zones. This reinforces the need to
account for genealogical discordance in our lineage, species and phylogeny concepts in
order to offer plausible biological interpretations of these findings. This
re-conceptualization, in turn, demands further refinement of phylogeny reconstruction in
order to appropriately capture the complexity of multilevel lineages in multidimensional
trees.
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Figure 5: Wimsatt’s (1972, figure 1) depiction of complexity and multiple decomposability.
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Figure 6: Degnan and Rosenberg’s (2009, figure 1) depiction of the multispecies coalescent.
This displays various decompositions of the species tree, and the discordances that arise.
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